The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980

Gregg A. Jarrell; James A. Brickley; Jeffry M. Netter

doi:10.1257/jep.2.1.49

Abstract

In the 1980s, the market for corporate control has been increasingly active, and the quantity of output of academic researchers studying corporate control questions has mirrored the market activity. This review examines the returns to bidders and targets, and the effects of defending against hostile takeovers.

Keywords

Market for corporate controlControl (management)Corporate financeEconomicsEmpirical evidenceBusinessAccountingCorporate governanceMonetary economicsFinanceManagementShareholder

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Publication Info

Year: 1988
Type: article
Volume: 2
Issue: 1
Pages: 49-68
Citations: 1140
Access: Closed

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APA Style

                            
                                    Gregg A. Jarrell, 
                                
                                    James A. Brickley, 
                                
                                    Jeffry M. Netter
                                
                            (1988). 
                            The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980. 
                            The Journal of Economic Perspectives
                            , 2
                            (1)
                            , 49-68.
                            https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.49

Identifiers

DOI: 10.1257/jep.2.1.49