Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
We propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post ef...
Publications
2 shownWhy Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is mo...
Frequent Co-Authors
Researcher Info
- h-index
- 2
- Publications
- 2
- Citations
- 1,922
- Institution
- Stockholm School of Economics
External Links
Identifiers
- ORCID
- 0000-0002-0954-4499
Impact Metrics
h-index
2
h-index: Number of publications with at least h citations each.