Abstract

Price adjustment mechanisms are employed in the electric utility industry to pass changes in fuel costs on to consumers without formal rate review by a regulatory commission. The predictability of this pass-through and the regulator's limited ability to observe the actions of a firm can create potential incentive problems associated with the choices of technology and fuel supply. This paper is concerned with the regulatory design of pass-through formulas when a factor price is uncertain. The optimal design involves deviating from the full-information optimal price formulas in order to mitigate the incentive problems. © 1981.

Keywords

EconomicsComputer science

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Year
1978
Type
preprint
Citations
5
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Closed

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DP Baron, Raymond De Bondt (1978). The design of automatic price adjustment mechanisms. Lirias (KU Leuven) . https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90065-x

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DOI
10.1016/0022-0531(81)90065-x