Abstract

For Latin American governments, mediating between their national societies and the international economy, the contemporary debt issue poses some excruciating dilemmas. On the one side, these governments are under intense pressure to arrive at satisfactory formulas for settling their debts–satisfactory, that is, to the banks and creditor agencies that control access to international financial markets. Loss of such access would threaten vital capital and trade flows, and for this reason virtually every Latin American government has so far placed a high priority on meeting its external obligations. But governmental elites, if they are to remain in power, must also answer to (or repress) their own populations. And the price to be paid for external help with “liquidity problems” has typically involved politically dangerous stabilization measures (devaluations, wage and credit restrictions, and fiscal deficit reductions)–measures that often arouse the strong opposition of major social forces.

Keywords

Latin AmericansCreditorOpposition (politics)DebtExternal debtDemocracyEconomicsAuthoritarianismMarket liquidityDebt crisisEconomic policyFinancial systemPolitical scienceMonetary economicsFinance

Related Publications

Understanding Economic Policy Reform

One of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis that erupted in 1982 was a wave of market-oriented economic reforms, the likes of which have never been seen. The refo...

2018 1283 citations

Publication Info

Year
1985
Type
article
Volume
39
Issue
3
Pages
473-503
Citations
67
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

67
OpenAlex

Cite This

Robert R. Kaufman (1985). Democratic and authoritarian responses to the debt issue: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico. International Organization , 39 (3) , 473-503. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300019159

Identifiers

DOI
10.1017/s0020818300019159