Abstract
of the
Keywords
EconomicsIncomplete contractsMathematical economicsMicroeconomicsIncentive
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1988
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 755-755
- Citations
- 1878
- Access
- Closed
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1878
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Cite This
Oliver Hart,
John Moore
(1988).
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.
Econometrica
, 56
(4)
, 755-755.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1912698
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/1912698