Abstract
Abstract This book focuses on the efficient and equitable management of local or village-level natural resources. It is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides an in-depth analysis on the optimal use of natural resources. It dwells on the “tragedy of the commons”, which attributes inefficient resource use to the absence of well-defined property rights. Non-cooperative game theory is used to examine the impact of human interactions on resource management, and discusses the implications of the privatisation of common property resources. In Part 2, the main lessons drawn from Part 1 are compared against evidence obtained from field settings, particularly traditional village societies in developing countries.
Keywords
Tragedy of the commonsCommon-pool resourceNatural resourceCommonsNatural (archaeology)Property rightsTragedy (event)Property (philosophy)Resource (disambiguation)Common propertyBusinessField (mathematics)Natural resource managementNatural resource economicsEnvironmental resource managementEnvironmental economicsEconomicsGeographyComputer sciencePolitical scienceMicroeconomicsSociologySocial scienceMathematicsLawEpistemology
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Publication Info
- Year
- 2000
- Type
- book
- Citations
- 275
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Jean‐Marie Baland,
Jean‐Philippe Platteau
(2000).
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources.
.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0198290616.001.0001
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1093/0198290616.001.0001