Abstract

Common-pool resources (CPR) are treated as if they were fully described by two characteristics-difficulty of exclusion and subtractability of yield. We focus upon two additional characteristics, mobile flows and storage in the resource. In examining CPR settings involving fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins, we find that users of these resources pursue different strategies and design different institutional arrangements depending upon whether the resource is characterized by mobile flows and/or storage. From this evidence, we develop a typology of CPRs that is useful for understanding and anticipating resource users' strategies in confronting and solving common-pool problems.

Keywords

BusinessComputer scienceEnvironmental economicsEconomics

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Publication Info

Year
1994
Type
article
Volume
70
Issue
3
Pages
294-294
Citations
264
Access
Closed

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Edella Schlager, William Blomquist, Shui Yan Tang (1994). Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources. Land Economics , 70 (3) , 294-294. https://doi.org/10.2307/3146531

Identifiers

DOI
10.2307/3146531