Abstract

This article examines the institutional preconditions or rules that shape collaborative natural resource management between public agencies and citizen groups. In particular, it asks: How do the preconditions surrounding a given natural resource, such as property rights, legislative frameworks, and agency performance incentives, circumscribe the possibilities for collaboration? Drawing upon irrigation and forest management policies and practices in India from the mid-1800s onward, it is argued that the context of irrigation provides some opportunities for supporting agency-citizen collaboration, whereas such efforts in forestry are unlikely to succeed without fundamental structural change.

Keywords

Agency (philosophy)Context (archaeology)IncentiveLegislatureNatural resource managementNatural resourceProperty rightsPublic administrationResource management (computing)Resource (disambiguation)BusinessPolitical scienceEnvironmental resource managementSociologyEconomicsLawGeographyMarket economy

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

A Grammar of Motives

Introduction Part One: Ways of Placement I. CONTAINER AND THING CONTAINED II. ANTINOMIES OF DEFINITION III. SCOPE AND REDUCTION Part Two: The Philosophic Schools I. SCENE II. AG...

2023 2710 citations

Publication Info

Year
2004
Type
article
Volume
36
Issue
2
Pages
208-242
Citations
29
Access
Closed

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

29
OpenAlex
0
Influential
19
CrossRef

Cite This

Alnoor Ebrahim (2004). Institutional Preconditions to Collaboration. Administration & Society , 36 (2) , 208-242. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399704263481

Identifiers

DOI
10.1177/0095399704263481

Data Quality

Data completeness: 77%