Abstract

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.

Keywords

Contemporary philosophyGeneral interestPhilosophyEpistemology

Related Publications

Participatory medicine

A recent study of ours1 showed that patients with moderate to severe psoriasis who were meditating, guided by meditation tapes, while they were undergoing UVB or PUVA treatments...

2000 Journal of the European Academy of De... 39 citations

Publication Info

Year
1974
Type
article
Volume
83
Issue
4
Pages
435-435
Citations
6522
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Altmetric

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

6522
OpenAlex

Cite This

Thomas Nagel (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat?. The Philosophical Review , 83 (4) , 435-435. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914

Identifiers

DOI
10.2307/2183914