Abstract

Abstract Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.

Keywords

JurisdictionGlobalizationCoercion (linguistics)Economic interdependencePolitical scienceState (computer science)Economic systemEconomic globalizationPolitical economySovereigntyLaw and economicsEconomicsComputer scienceLaw

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Publication Info

Year
2019
Type
article
Volume
44
Issue
1
Pages
42-79
Citations
1122
Access
Closed

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Henry Farrell, Abraham L. Newman (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security , 44 (1) , 42-79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351

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DOI
10.1162/isec_a_00351