Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The “Theory-Informity” of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis

1990 Philosophy of Science 49 citations

Abstract

It is argued that neither the “theory-informity” of observations nor the Quine-Duhem thesis pose any in principle threat to the objectivity of theory evaluation. The employment of exploratory theories does not generate incommensurability, but on the contrary is responsible for the mensurability and commensurability of explanatory theories , since exploratory theories enable scientists to make observations which are critical in the evaluation of explanatory theories. The employment of exploratory theories and other auxiliary hypotheses does not enable a theory to always accommodate recalcitrant observations to preserve evidential equivalence with a rival theory. Explanatory theories become rapidly degenerating if exploratory theories or other auxiliary hypotheses which inform the original confirmation base are modified to accommodate recalcitrant observations.

Keywords

Commensurability (mathematics)QuineEpistemologyEmpiricismPhilosophy of scienceIntrospectionObjectivity (philosophy)PhilosophyPhysicalismExploratory researchMetaphysicsMathematicsSociologySocial science

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Publication Info

Year
1990
Type
article
Volume
57
Issue
4
Pages
553-574
Citations
49
Access
Closed

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John D. Greenwood (1990). Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The “Theory-Informity” of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis. Philosophy of Science , 57 (4) , 553-574. https://doi.org/10.1086/289579

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DOI
10.1086/289579