Abstract

Three trade wars are examined using variable-sum game theory. The Anglo-Hanse trade wars (1300–1700) are explained as an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma that failed to evolve into cooperation due to transaction costs, rent seeking, and economic recession. The late-igthcentury tariff war between France and Italy is a case of an asymmetric trade war that illustrates the danger to a weak country of provoking a trade war with a strong country, with the result that the former is forced to make major concessions. The Hawley-Smoot conflicts of the 1930s are cited as an example of the cooperation-inhibiting effect of publicness in trade negotiations.

Keywords

Trade warNegotiationEconomicsRecessionDilemmaTariffBilateral tradeInternational tradeMultilateral trade negotiationsFree tradeTrade barrierInternational economicsPolitical scienceKeynesian economicsLawChinaPhilosophy

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Publication Info

Year
1985
Type
article
Volume
38
Issue
1
Pages
147-172
Citations
74
Access
Closed

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John A. C. Conybeare (1985). Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts. World Politics , 38 (1) , 147-172. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010354

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DOI
10.2307/2010354