Abstract
Three trade wars are examined using variable-sum game theory. The Anglo-Hanse trade wars (1300–1700) are explained as an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma that failed to evolve into cooperation due to transaction costs, rent seeking, and economic recession. The late-igthcentury tariff war between France and Italy is a case of an asymmetric trade war that illustrates the danger to a weak country of provoking a trade war with a strong country, with the result that the former is forced to make major concessions. The Hawley-Smoot conflicts of the 1930s are cited as an example of the cooperation-inhibiting effect of publicness in trade negotiations.
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1985
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147-172
- Citations
- 74
- Access
- Closed
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- DOI
- 10.2307/2010354