Abstract
Under existing federal and state law, a corporation's managers can resist
Keywords
Tender offerBusinessLaw and economicsSociologyFinanceCorporate governance
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1981
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1161-1161
- Citations
- 283
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Frank H. Easterbrook,
Daniel R. Fischel
(1981).
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer.
Harvard Law Review
, 94
(6)
, 1161-1161.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1340753
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/1340753