Abstract
The economic literature about dividends usually assumes that managers are perfect agents of investors, and it seeks to determine why these agents pay dividends. Other literature about the firm assumes that managers are imperfect agents and inquires how managers' interests may be aligned with shareholders' interests. These two lines of inquiry rarely meet.' Yet logically any dividend policy (or any other corporate policy) should be designed to minimize the sum of capital, agency, and taxation costs. The purpose of this paper is to ask whether dividends are a method of aligning managers' interests with those of investors. It offers agency-cost explanations of dividends.
Keywords
DividendAgency costDividend policyAgency (philosophy)ImperfectEconomicsShareholderCapital (architecture)Principal–agent problemMicroeconomicsBusinessFinanceCorporate governanceSociology
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1984
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 650-659
- Citations
- 3089
- Access
- Closed
External Links
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Cite This
Frank H. Easterbrook
(1984).
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends.
, 74
(4)
, 650-659.