Keywords
Separation (statistics)BusinessControl (management)EconomicsMathematicsStatistics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1983
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 301-325
- Citations
- 18569
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Eugene F. Fama,
Michael C. Jensen
(1983).
Separation of Ownership and Control.
The Journal of Law and Economics
, 26
(2)
, 301-325.
https://doi.org/10.1086/467037
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1086/467037