Abstract

The authors present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. As a result, prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk. Moreover, bearing a disproportionate amount of risk that they themselves create enables noise traders to earn a higher expected return than rational investors do. The model sheds light on a number of financial anomalies. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Keywords

Limits to arbitrageEconomicsArbitrageMean reversionStock (firearms)Financial economicsEquity (law)Capital asset pricing modelFinancial marketVolatility (finance)Asset (computer security)Rational expectationsIrrational numberRisk premiumMonetary economicsEconometricsFinance

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Publication Info

Year
1990
Type
article
Volume
98
Issue
4
Pages
703-738
Citations
6228
Access
Closed

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Cite This

J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers et al. (1990). Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets. Journal of Political Economy , 98 (4) , 703-738. https://doi.org/10.1086/261703

Identifiers

DOI
10.1086/261703