Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance

Linda DeAngelo

doi:10.1016/0165-4101(88)90021-3

Keywords

CONTESTShareholderEarningsCorporate governanceVotingDiscretionStock (firearms)Corporate financeAccountingEconomicsMonetary economicsBusinessBlameWageProxy (statistics)Labour economicsFinancePolitics

Affiliated Institutions

University of Rochester US

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Publication Info

Year: 1988
Type: article
Volume: 10
Issue: 1
Pages: 3-36
Citations: 600
Access: Closed

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APA Style

                            
                                    Linda DeAngelo
                                
                            (1988). 
                            Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance. 
                            Journal of Accounting and Economics
                            , 10
                            (1)
                            , 3-36.
                            https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(88)90021-3

Identifiers

DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(88)90021-3