Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills

James A. Brickley; Jeffrey L. Coles; Rory L. Terry

doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8

Keywords

CONTESTPillShareholderBusinessStock priceMarket for corporate controlStock (firearms)AccountingFinanceCorporate governanceLawPolitical scienceMedicinePharmacologyEngineering

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns

Eugene F. Fama , Kenneth R. French

ABSTRACT Two easily measured variables, size and book‐to‐market equity, combine to capture the cross‐sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market β , size...

1992 The Journal of Finance 14994 citations

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?

Ernst Maug

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' inc...

1998 The Journal of Finance 1482 citations

1993 The Journal of Finance 11191 citations

Publication Info

Year: 1994
Type: article
Volume: 35
Issue: 3
Pages: 371-390
Citations: 1204
Access: Closed

External Links

View on DOI.org

Social Impact

Altmetric

Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills

PlumX Metrics

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

1204

OpenAlex

Cite This

APA Style

                            
                                    James A. Brickley, 
                                
                                    Jeffrey L. Coles, 
                                
                                    Rory L. Terry
                                
                            (1994). 
                            Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. 
                            Journal of Financial Economics
                            , 35
                            (3)
                            , 371-390.
                            https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8

Identifiers

DOI: 10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8

Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills

Keywords

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?

Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan

Do outside directors monitor managers?

Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency

Publication Info

External Links

Social Impact

Citation Metrics

Cite This

Identifiers