Abstract
Exchange theories posit that trust has an important and favorable influence on dyadic interactions. This paper examines the notion that trust plays a key role in making a seller's tough bargaining strategy successful. In a bargaining experiment, we manipulated subjects' preconceptions about a seller's trustworthiness and bargaining toughness. As hypothesized, a seller's expected trustworthiness-plus-toughness in bargaining led to higher levels of buyer-seller cooperation and agreement and a higher level of buyer concessions.
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1985
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 939-939
- Citations
- 1243
- Access
- Closed
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Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1086/209028