Keywords
Stylized factBusinessInformation asymmetryMonetary economicsEconomicsEconometricsFinanceMacroeconomics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1990
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1069-1069
- Citations
- 825
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Steven A. Sharpe
(1990).
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships.
The Journal of Finance
, 45
(4)
, 1069-1069.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2328715
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/2328715