Abstract

This article examines the role of relationship lending in small firm finance. It examines price and nonprice terms of bank lines of credit (L/Cs) extended to small firms. The focus on LICs allows the examination of a type of loan contract in which the hank- borrower relationship is likely to be an important mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problems associated with financing small enterprises. We find that borrowers with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral.These results are consistent with theoretical arguments that relationship lending generates valuable information about borrower quality.

Keywords

PledgeCollateralLoanBusinessInformation asymmetryQuality (philosophy)Financial systemFinanceMonetary economicsEconomics

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Publication Info

Year
1995
Type
article
Volume
68
Issue
3
Pages
351-351
Citations
829
Access
Closed

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Allen N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell (1995). Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance. The Journal of Business , 68 (3) , 351-351. https://doi.org/10.1086/296668

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DOI
10.1086/296668