Keywords
Agency costPrincipal–agent problemEquity (law)DebtEconomicsAgency (philosophy)BusinessPareto principleLaw and economicsFinanceAccountingCorporate governanceLawSociologyPolitical science
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1976
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 305-360
- Citations
- 68299
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Michael C. Jensen,
William H. Meckling
(1976).
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.
Journal of Financial Economics
, 3
(4)
, 305-360.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x