Abstract
One reason for people's voluntary cooperation in social dilemmas, or altruistic behavior in general, may be their belief that altruism pays off in terms of long-run self-interest Although this is often true, it is typically false in large-scale social dilemmas among strangers In three questionnaire studies, subjects endorsed this self-interest illusion frequently for large-scale dilemmas, such as overfishing and pollution, in which the benefits of cooperation are delayed.
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1997
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 330-335
- Citations
- 55
- Access
- Closed
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Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00448.x