Keywords
ShareholderCreditorCorporationBusinessPrincipal–agent problemAgency (philosophy)Agency costLeaseCapital structureAccountingCorporate financeActuarial scienceFinanceLaw and economicsCorporate governanceEconomics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 2000
- Type
- article
- Citations
- 294
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Michael C. Jensen,
Clifford W. Smith
(2000).
Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory.
SSRN Electronic Journal
.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.173461
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2139/ssrn.173461