Abstract
This paper explores the ramifications of introducing administered contracts -- long term, collective contractual relationships -- into economic analysis with attention being focused on the implicit regulatory contract. The perspective afforded by the administered contracts framework suggests that the economist's case against regulation has been overstated. Many of the problems associated with regulation lie in what is being regulated, not in the act of regulation itself. Further, many of the perceived failures of regulation (for example, entry restrictions) can be seen to have a plausible efficiency rationale.
Keywords
EconomicsMicroeconomics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1976
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 426-426
- Citations
- 747
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Victor P. Goldberg
(1976).
Regulation and Administered Contracts.
The Bell Journal of Economics
, 7
(2)
, 426-426.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3003265
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/3003265