Abstract

We argue that the random oracle model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol PR for the random oracle model, and then replacing oracle accesses by the computation of an "appropriately chosen" function h. This paradigm yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security. We illustrate these gains for problems including encryption, signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs.

Keywords

Computer scienceTheoretical computer scienceProgramming language

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Publication Info

Year
1993
Type
article
Pages
62-73
Citations
4612
Access
Closed

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Mihir Bellare, Phillip Rogaway (1993). Random oracles are practical. , 62-73. https://doi.org/10.1145/168588.168596

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DOI
10.1145/168588.168596