Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments

Keywords

ShareholderVotingIncentiveOpposition (politics)BusinessHarmInstitutional investorPensionFinanceStock (firearms)AccountingControl (management)EconomicsCorporate governanceMarket economyLaw

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Publication Info

Year: 1988
Type: article
Volume: 20
Pages: 267-291
Citations: 1609
Access: Closed

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APA Style

                            
                                    James A. Brickley, 
                                
                                    Ronald C. Lease, 
                                
                                    Clifford W. Smith
                                
                            (1988). 
                            Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. 
                            Journal of Financial Economics
                            , 20
                            
                            , 267-291.
                            https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5

Identifiers

DOI: 10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5