Abstract

Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.

Keywords

CommitArgument (complex analysis)PhilosophyEpistemologyMechanism (biology)Reflexive pronounSet (abstract data type)Mathematical economicsMathematicsComputer science

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Publication Info

Year
1961
Type
article
Volume
36
Issue
137
Pages
112-127
Citations
561
Access
Closed

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Cite This

J. R. Lucas (1961). Minds, Machines and Gödel. Philosophy , 36 (137) , 112-127. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100057983

Identifiers

DOI
10.1017/s0031819100057983