Abstract

Cellular networks can be operated more energy-efficiently if operators agree to share base-stations during off-peak hours. We apply a micro-economic analysis for a single-cell two-operator scenario to investigate the conditions under which self-interested operators would agree to share resources in this manner. Our analysis yields a comprehensive treatment of the existence and number of Nash Equilibria. We consider the cases when the payment rates are exogenous, as well as when they can be set strategically by the operators. Through numerical solutions we examine the quality of the best and worst Nash Equilibria in comparison with the globally optimized solution. Our results show that there is often a sensitive dependence on key parameters such as energy price, capacity, load, revenues, penalties and payments.

Keywords

Nash equilibriumPaymentBase stationOperator (biology)RevenueComputer scienceBase (topology)Mathematical optimizationSet (abstract data type)Key (lock)Cellular networkGame theoryQuality (philosophy)Operations researchMathematical economicsComputer networkEconomicsMathematicsComputer securityChemistryFinance

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Publication Info

Year
2014
Type
article
Pages
1132-1140
Citations
37
Access
Closed

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37
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Cite This

Bingjie Leng, Parisa Mansourifard, Bhaskar Krishnamachari (2014). Microeconomic analysis of base-station sharing in green cellular networks. IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications , 1132-1140. https://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2014.6848044

Identifiers

DOI
10.1109/infocom.2014.6848044

Data Quality

Data completeness: 77%