Abstract

Data on market relations between a large population of corporations and investment banks are used to study the organization-market interforce-the pattern of direct market ties between a firm and its banks. Forms of interfaces range from a long-term, exclusive tie (the relationship interface) to many short-lived, episodic ties (the transaction interface), with hybrid forms between the two poles. Contrary to widespread belief, the article finds that strong relationships still exist. Transactions interfaces are rare. Most firms use hybrid interfaces. A firm's interface is conceptualized as the intentional result of its efforts to reduce dependence and exploit power advantages. Observed interfaces are shown to be related systematically to various power-dependence concepts, including resource intensity (number of transactions and dollar amounts raised), criticality (the availability of resource alternatives), power asymmetry between a firm and its main bank, organization size, standardization of exchange, and the use of tandem strategies (director interlocks).

Keywords

BusinessIndustrial organizationExploitDatabase transactionInterface (matter)Resource (disambiguation)Investment (military)Resource dependence theoryInterlockMicroeconomicsEconomicsComputer scienceComputer security

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Publication Info

Year
1990
Type
article
Volume
96
Issue
3
Pages
589-625
Citations
1209
Access
Closed

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Cite This

Wayne E. Baker (1990). Market Networks and Corporate Behavior. American Journal of Sociology , 96 (3) , 589-625. https://doi.org/10.1086/229573

Identifiers

DOI
10.1086/229573