Abstract

This article analyzes the role of top management as a key resource in obtaining sustained, competitive advantage for thefirm. The nature of managerial skills is examined and linked to isolating mechanisms and firm rents. The article aims to refocus attention on the importance of managerial expertise as a rent-generating firm resource and implies greater alignment of top management-shareholder interests than in many applications of agency theory to the firm.

Keywords

Economic rentBusinessIndustrial organizationAgency (philosophy)Competitive advantageResource (disambiguation)ShareholderKey (lock)Principal–agent problemTheory of the firmMicroeconomicsEconomicsMarketingFinanceCorporate governanceComputer science

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

Publication Info

Year
1991
Type
article
Volume
17
Issue
1
Pages
155-171
Citations
1083
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Altmetric

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

1083
OpenAlex

Cite This

Richard P. Castanias, Constance E. Helfat (1991). Managerial Resources and Rents. Journal of Management , 17 (1) , 155-171. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700110

Identifiers

DOI
10.1177/014920639101700110