Abstract
We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q.In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as board of directors holdings rise.For older firms there is weak evidence that Q is lower when a firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder.
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1986
- Type
- report
- Citations
- 94
- Access
- Closed
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- DOI
- 10.3386/w2055