Abstract

ABSTRACT While the benefits of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not. This paper argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.

Keywords

DebtPortfolioBargaining powerBusinessFinancePower (physics)EconomicsDebt financingMonetary economicsMicroeconomics

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Publication Info

Year
1992
Type
article
Volume
47
Issue
4
Pages
1367-1400
Citations
3828
Access
Closed

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Cite This

Raghuram G. Rajan (1992). Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt. The Journal of Finance , 47 (4) , 1367-1400. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x

Identifiers

DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x