Abstract

This paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions. The model is cast in a financial market framework, thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries. Intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present, and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable. The usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed.

Keywords

Financial intermediaryReliability (semiconductor)IntermediationEconomicsLibrary scienceSociologyAccountingComputer scienceFinancial systemFinancePhysics

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Publication Info

Year
1984
Type
article
Volume
51
Issue
3
Pages
415-415
Citations
1208
Access
Closed

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Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan, Anjan V. Thakor (1984). Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation. The Review of Economic Studies , 51 (3) , 415-415. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297431

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DOI
10.2307/2297431