Abstract
We are grateful for the comments of Kenneth Arrow, Kennette Benedict, Robert Biller, David Brereton, Louise Comfort, Jerry Feldman, Victor Fuchs, Anne Miner, J. Rounds, Alan Saltzstein, Guje Sevon, and J. Serge Taylor; for the assistance of Julia Ball; and for grants from the Spencer Foundation, Brookings Institution, Hoover Institution, and National Institute of Education. Formal theories of rational choice suggest that information about the possible consequences of alternative actions will be sought and used only if the precision, relevance, and reliability of the information are compatible with its cost. Empirical studies of information in organizations portray a pattern that is hard to rationalize in such terms. In particular, organizations systematically gather more information than they use, yet continue to ask for more. We suggest that this behavior is a consequence of some ways in which organizational settings for information use differ from those anticipated in a simple decision-theory vision. In particular, the use of information is embedded in social normsthat make it highly symbolic. Some of the implications of such a pattern of information use are discussed.
Keywords
InstitutionRelevance (law)SociologySymbol (formal)ArrowEpistemologyManagementPsychologyComputer scienceEconomicsPolitical scienceLawSocial sciencePhilosophy
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1981
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 171-171
- Citations
- 1697
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Martha S. Feldman,
James G. March
(1981).
Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol.
Administrative Science Quarterly
, 26
(2)
, 171-171.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2392467
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/2392467