Abstract

A philosophical essay under this title faces severe rhetorical challenges. New accounts of the good life regularly and rapidly turn out to be variations of old ones, subject to a predictable range of decisive objections. Attempts to meet those objections with improved accounts regularly and rapidly lead to a familiar impasse — that while a life of contemplation, or epicurean contentment, or stoic indifference, or religious ecstasy, or creative rebellion, or self-actualization, or many another thing might count as a good life, none of them can plausibly be identified with the good life, or the best life. Given the long history of that impasse, it seems futile to offer yet another candidate for the genus “good life” as if that candidate might be new, or philosophically defensible. And given the weariness, irony, and self-deprecation expected of a philosopher in such an impasse, it is difficult for any substantive proposal on this topic to avoid seeming pretentious.

Keywords

ContemplationIronyThe good lifeRhetorical questionEpistemologyPhilosophySubject (documents)HappinessExposition (narrative)AestheticsPsychologyLiteratureSocial psychology

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Publication Info

Year
1992
Type
article
Volume
9
Issue
2
Pages
15-37
Citations
103
Access
Closed

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Lawrence C. Becker (1992). Good Lives: Prolegomena. Social Philosophy and Policy , 9 (2) , 15-37. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500001382

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DOI
10.1017/s0265052500001382