Abstract

After some general remarks about the interrelation between\nphilosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on\nsignificance tests. These are defined as the calculation of $p$-values rather\nthan as formal procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types\nof null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation\nset out governing the implications of $p$-values in the specific circumstances\nof each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of\nmore complicated situations are discussed in which modification of the simple\n$p$-value may be essential.

Keywords

Frequentist inferenceInterpretation (philosophy)Statistical inferenceNull hypothesisInferenceVariety (cybernetics)EpistemologyInductive reasoningValue (mathematics)Set (abstract data type)Simple (philosophy)Null (SQL)StatisticsMathematicsStatistical hypothesis testingComputer sciencePhilosophyData miningBayesian inferenceBayesian probability

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

Testing Precise Hypotheses

Testing of precise (point or small interval) hypotheses is reviewed, with special emphasis placed on exploring the dramatic conflict between conditional measures (Bayes factors ...

1987 Statistical Science 676 citations

Bayes Factors

Abstract In a 1935 paper and in his book Theory of Probability, Jeffreys developed a methodology for quantifying the evidence in favor of a scientific theory. The centerpiece wa...

1995 Journal of the American Statistical A... 11631 citations

Publication Info

Year
2006
Type
book-chapter
Pages
77-97
Citations
121
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

121
OpenAlex

Cite This

Deborah G. Mayo, David Cox (2006). Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference. Institute of Mathematical Statistics eBooks , 77-97. https://doi.org/10.1214/074921706000000400

Identifiers

DOI
10.1214/074921706000000400