Abstract

In this article, we accomplish two things. First, we show that despite empirical psychologists’ nominal endorsement of a low rate of false-positive findings (≤ .05), flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting dramatically increases actual false-positive rates. In many cases, a researcher is more likely to falsely find evidence that an effect exists than to correctly find evidence that it does not. We present computer simulations and a pair of actual experiments that demonstrate how unacceptably easy it is to accumulate (and report) statistically significant evidence for a false hypothesis. Second, we suggest a simple, low-cost, and straightforwardly effective disclosure-based solution to this problem. The solution involves six concrete requirements for authors and four guidelines for reviewers, all of which impose a minimal burden on the publication process.

Keywords

PsychologyFlexibility (engineering)Empirical evidenceProcess (computing)Simple (philosophy)Social psychologyCognitive psychologyStatisticsComputer scienceEpistemologyMathematics

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Publication Info

Year
2011
Type
article
Volume
22
Issue
11
Pages
1359-1366
Citations
6469
Access
Closed

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Cite This

Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, Uri Simonsohn (2011). False-Positive Psychology. Psychological Science , 22 (11) , 1359-1366. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417632

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DOI
10.1177/0956797611417632