Abstract
What circumstances favor the realization of mutual interests in the absence of centralized authority? And through what strategies can nations foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances that they confront? Elementary game theory suggests three sets of conditions that serve as proximate explanations of the incidence of cooperation and discord: (i) Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting Preferences; (2) The Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated Games; and (3) Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games. Each of these three attributes of context may be subject to willful modification. Nations may create the preconditions for cooperation through strategies to alter payoffs, lengthen the shadow of the future, and reduce the number of actors required to realize limited mutual interests.
Keywords
Shadow (psychology)Stochastic gameContext (archaeology)Realization (probability)Non-cooperative gameGame theoryLaw and economicsEconomicsMicroeconomicsPsychologyMathematics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1985
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- Citations
- 599
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Kenneth A. Oye
(1985).
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies.
World Politics
, 38
(1)
, 1-24.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2010349
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/2010349