Experiential Theory of Emotion Applied to Anxiety and Depression

Abstract

Abstract The experiential theory of emotion presented here summarizes views developed by Greenberg and associates (Greenberg, Elliott, & Foerster, 1990; Greenberg, Rice, & Elliott, 1993; Greenberg & Safran, 1987). It integrates traditional experiential concepts (Gendlin, 1981; Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1957; Rogers, 1958) with recent developments in cognitive psychology and current emotion theory. Traditionally, the experiential/humanistic view of functioning is wholistic, positing an internal, tacit synthesizing process that guides the organism to adaptive action. In this view, emotion plays a central role and is intimately connected with cognitive, motivational, and physiological processes. Emotion is considered adaptive and a source of orienting information about self and the world. Perls and colleagues emphasized the role of emotion, particularly avoidance of painful emotion, in dysfunction. Other theorists (Gendlin, 1981; Rogers, 1958) have been concerned with the broader concept of experience, which consists of both emotion as sensorimotor response and the meaning of a feeling in context. The general assumption in this view is that being cut off from the adaptive information inherent in emotion impedes growth and healthy functioning.

Keywords

Affiliated Institutions

• University of Saskatchewan CA

Related Publications