Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Adjudication in Iran, Iraq, and Malaysia

Abstract

Constitutional adjudication is one of the fundamental mechanisms for ensuring the supremacy of the constitution and protecting fundamental rights. A comparative study of different systems shows that the structure and function of constitutional adjudication yield diverse outcomes within distinct political and legal contexts. This article examines and compares constitutional adjudication in Iran, Iraq, and Malaysia. In Iran, the Guardian Council functions as the primary body for constitutional adjudication; however, the lack of direct access for citizens and the political nature of the Council have created significant challenges. In Iraq, the Federal Supreme Court plays a central role with broad jurisdiction in interpreting the constitution and resolving federal disputes, although political and ethnic pressures have limited its independence and effectiveness. In Malaysia, the model of constitutional adjudication is based on the common law and judicial system; the Federal Courts have the authority to oversee legislation and executive decisions, yet security and religious considerations impose serious restrictions on the protection of fundamental rights. Comparative analysis shows that all three systems face challenges such as political influence and weak public access, but they differ significantly in structure, methodology, and the level of protection for fundamental rights. In conclusion, recommendations are provided to improve the constitutional adjudication system in Iran.

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