Abstract
From the Publisher: The old opposition of matter versus mind stubbornly persists in the way we study mind and brain. In treating cognition as problem solving, Andy Clark suggests, we may often abstract too far from the very body and world in which our brains evolved to guide us. Whereas the mental has been treated as a realm that is distinct from the body and the world, Clark forcefully attests that a key to understanding brains is to see them as controllers of embodied activity. From this paradigm shift he advances the construction of a cognitive science of the embodied mind.
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1998
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 647-647
- Citations
- 3150
- Access
- Closed
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Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/2998391