Achievement motivation: Conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice, and performance.

1984 Psychological Review 3,862 citations

Abstract

Achievement behavior is denned as behavior directed at developing or demonstrating high rather than low ability. It is shown that ability can be conceived in two ways. First, ability can be judged high or low with reference to the individual's own past performance or knowledge. In this context, gains in mastery indicate competence. Second, ability can be judged as capacity relative to that of others. In this context, a gain in mastery alone does not indicate high ability. To demonstrate high capacity, one must achieve more with equal effort or use less effort than do others for an equal performance. The conditions under which these different conceptions of ability function as individuals' goals and the nature of subjective experience in each case are specified. Different predictions of task choice and performance are derived and tested for each case. In this article, predictions of task choice, performance, and subjective experience in experimental achievement settings are derived, and relevant evidence is examined. An intentional view of behavior (Dennett, 1978) is adopted. In this, action is construed as a rational attempt to attain goals or incentives. In commonsense terms, individuals' actions serve to achieve purposes efficiently or economically. In the terms of games theory, action maximizes

Keywords

PsychologyTask (project management)Cognitive psychologyNeed for achievementSocial psychology

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Publication Info

Year
1984
Type
article
Volume
91
Issue
3
Pages
328-346
Citations
3862
Access
Closed

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John G. Nicholls (1984). Achievement motivation: Conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice, and performance.. Psychological Review , 91 (3) , 328-346. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.91.3.328

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DOI
10.1037/0033-295x.91.3.328